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Abstract- We propose a secure video authentication algorithm 
that is tolerant to visual degradation due to MPEG lossy com- 
pression to a designed level. The authentication process generates 
a tag that is sent with video data and the level of protection can be 
adjusted so that longer tags are used for higher security, and that 
the protection is distributed such that higher security is provided 
for regions of interest in the image. The computation required for 
authentication and verification can he largely performed as part 
of MPEG compression and so generation and verificatiun of the 
tag can he integrated into the compression system. Calculation 
of the tag can he parallelized and so made fast. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In many applications such as news reporting and surveil- 
lance, the visual data must be authenticated. Visual data is 
communicated in compressed form. A compression tolerant 
authentication system will tolerate changes that are due to 
lossy compression, while detecting other changes. Crypto- 
graphic authentication systems are sensitive to a single hit 
change in data and so cannot he directly used for compression 
tolerant authentication. In this paper we consider MPEG 
tolerant video authentication systems. 
Compression tolerant video authentication systems can be 
broadly divided into feature ertraction systems and water- 
marking systems. In the former the authentication system 
extracts features (also called signature, digest or message 
authentication code (MAC)) of the video data that remain 
invariant through lossy compression to the given quality level. 
An authenticated video stream consists of a compressed video 
stream and a feature stream. In watermarking approach, a 
fragile watermark [I] is embedded in the video data and the 
watermark must be destroyed when the video is tampered 
with. Reconciling fragility and compression tolerance is a 
challenging task. Another disadvantage of the watermarking 
approach is the degradation of quality due to the embedded 
noise (i.e. the watermark). 
In this paper we propose a MAC system for video data 
that tolerate MPEG compression to a given quality level. We 
evaluate the effectiveness of the system by considering attacks 
and show the best known attack is computationally expensive. 
Although this does not prove security of the system in general 
but gives an estimate of the cost against known attacks. The 
system has a number of attractive properties. 
1) The main computation of the system is computing the 
Discrete Cosine Trnnsform (DCT) [2] of image blocks 
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which is part of MPEG compression algorithm and so 
the proposed system can he effectively integrated into 
MPEG. 
2) The computation is parallelizahle and the system can be 
used for real-time authentication of data. 
3) The system provides flexible protection. It allows longer 
MACS to he used for higher level of protection and 
supports non-uniform protection; that is, selected parts 
of an image can he protected to a higher level. This is 
a useful property for protection of regions of interest in 
images. 
Section I1 gives an overview of MPEG. In Section III we 
describe our system and show its properties. Section IV de- 
scribe the feature codes to construct a message authentication 
system and in Section V we analyze the security of this system. 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
11. MPEG COMPRESSION 
A video compression standard MPEG [3] is a lossy com- 
pression system. In an MPEG video stream, the image se- 
quence is encoded as a sequence of intra, forward predicted, 
and bidirectional prediction frames [41. An intra frame ( I -  
frame) is encoded without reference to any other frames; a 
forward predicted frame (Plframe) is encoded relative to the 
past reference I- or P- frame and a bidirectional prediction 
frame (Blframe) is encoded relative to the past andor  future 
reference I- or P- frames. 
A frame is divided into 16 x 16 macmblocks. A macroblock 
consists of 4 luminance, and 2 chrominance 8 x 8 blocks 
for 4:2:0 chroma format and 4 chrominance blocks for 4:2:2 
format. In an 1-frame, the transform coding is performed on the 
macroblocks called intra macmblocks. Each of 8 x 8 blocks in 
an intra macroblock is transformed into 64 coefficients using 
DCT. This is followed by a scalar quantizer that replaces 
each DCT coefficient with an integer. Finally the 64 quantized 
coefficients are ”zig-zag ” scanned and are entropy-coded. The 
macroblocks in P- and B- frame are either encoded as a motion 
vector and an ermr term between the macroblock and the area, 
or intra-coded. 
The information loss is primarily due to quantization. How- 
ever computation error also contributes to the difference he- 
tween the values of a pixel, before and after the compression. 
111. AN MPEG TOLERANT AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
We propose a message authentication code (MAC) that con- 
sists offeature codes which are obtained by encoding a linear 
combination of DCT coefficients of subsets of blocks. The 
MAC tolerates MPEG compression above a given compression 
quality level. 
A. Aurhenrication 
8 x 8 pixel blocks in an I-frame are divided into subsets 
and DCT coefficients in a subset is used to generate a feature 
code. 
In the following, we assume Ai(") ax non-negative integers 
although the approach can also he used for arbitrary Ai(') 
values. Let {G1,Gz . . .Gp,m} be a partition of blocks as- 
suming the subsets have m blocks each. Blocks in a group j 
are labeled by 1 to m. The feature code generation algorithm 
is as follows. 
FOR VIDEO DATA 
1) Find the DCT coefficients of each block. 
2) Let Fi,j(") denote the DCT coefficient in position 
(frequency) U of the ith block in G j .  Then = 
CaiElm1 Ai(")Fi,j(') is the weighted sum of all coeffi- 
cients in ~ ~ ( " 1 .  
3 )  Afeature code is generated by encoding Yj("). 
The correctness of the message authentication algorithm 
follows from the observation that the value of a linear sum as 
defined above, in the original image and its decompressed ver- 
sion, will remain 'close' and this closeness can be estimated. 
Theorem 1, proved in [5]  and re-stated here for completeness, 
formalizes this statement. To state the theorem we need the 
following notations. 
Denote the set of integers {1,2,3 ,..., m} by [m]. Let 
F ("I % = % = h, + r, be the DCC coefficient in position U 
in block p ,  divided by the corresponding quantization scalar, 
and -0.5 5 rp < 0.5. 
The origjnal and reconstructed DCT coefficient values, 
F,(") and F p ) ,  are related as follows. 
F,(") = RpQ(") = h,Q('J) + rpQ(") 
= rint(llp)Q(") = FP(") -r,Q(") 
Let k be a real number. Then $q = k(")+r(") and -0.5 5 
r(") < 0.5 and the reconstructed value of k is k = k(")Q("). 
For DC and AC coefficients we have the following two 
theorems, respectively. 
Theorem I: Let k he a real number and E he de- 
fined as above. Also let Yi(") be as above, and %(") = 
Cauiml Ai(")$Y), and L = Cai+] IA;(")\. 
and 5'") are related as 
follows: 
Then for all j = 1,2,  ..., g. 
I )  If = k, 
(k(') - 0.5(1 + lAi'")I))Q(") < q(") 
viE[ml 
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< (E(") + 0.5(1 + IAi(")l))Q(") 
ViE(m1 
2) If %(") < k, 
3) If q ( u )  > k, 
< k(")Q(") +O.SQ(")(l + 1 lAi(")l) 
V&[ml 
y;'") > - 0,5Q(")(1 + IAi(u)I) 
V i ~ [ m ]  
Theorem 2: For any quantizer scale S E [l, 311, the follow- 
ing condition is true. 
Vic[ml 
Then, 
1) If I;(") < k, then < k + E&(") &E[ml lAi(")l. 
2) Ify,(") = k, y.(d 3 - ss a& (4 Cvi+lIAi( "1 I < - R&) 5 
3) If E;(") > k, then 
qC" + E&'") CviElml IAi(")I. 
95 (4 > k - gQ &iElml 
I )  Fearure Code: A feature code IS a binary string which 
represents %("I; the length N(") of a feature code is the 
accuracy @recision) of representation and determines the 
interval of the acceptable quality level for MPEG compression. 
Let [ F M ~ N ( " ) ,  F M A ~ ( " ) )  be the range of the DCT coefficient 
in position U, the sequence of hits ZjJ),Z&), ...,Zj$(ul rep- 
resent the feature code for %("), and U ( N ( U ) )  =FMIN(") +
CN'"'(FMAX(~) ,=I - FMI"(")) . 2-i . Zj:), Then the interval 
[u(N(")) ,  u(N("))  + (FMA,(") - F M ~ N ( ~ ) ) z - N ' " ' )  satisfies 
the following condition [51. 
U(N(") )  5 ' %("I < U ( N ( " ) )  
+(FMAx(") - F ~ I N ( " ) ) 2 - " " ' .  
2 )  Findin the Tolerance Interval: The difference between 
and obtained from the decompressed image, is due 
to the quantizarion error and calculation errors. 
is the weighted 
sum of m random variables, each corresponding to the 
quantization error of a single coefficient. That is, A = 
Ai(")& where Si = $7) - Pj,j("). Our experi- 
ments showed that this variable has a symmetric zero-mean 
Gaussian-like distribution and its variance depends on the 
frequency and quality level of the compression. For lower 
quality levels and lower frequencies, the distribution of the 
quantization error has a large variance and is close to the 
uniform distribution. 
The computation error is caused by inaccuracies introduced 
during computation, including the finite precision calculations 
used in the implementation of MPEG and other errors such 
as those resulting from integer representation of real valued 
The quantization error A = y;'"' - 
coefficients. Let E$) E B denote the error in  the reconstructed 
value $;'. Then we have 
It can be shown [5] that the error in c(("(":s of the form 
Cvic[ml A;("'EI:). Let be a non-negative real number 
such that -7(4 5 &ic[ml  ai("'^$) 5 d") For Gj("),j = 
1,2 ,  ...,g and assume &fi) has a normal distribution with zero- 
mean. Then for large m, 
" )Q("). 
F,.i 
= T i n t (  
and the errors will cancel out. However, using larger sums 
reduces security of the system. 
E. Verification 
Theorem 1 shows that the reconstructed linear sums will he 
close to the values calculated from the original Frame. As long 
as is within the interval [ U ( N ) , U ( N )  + ( F M A X ( ~ )  - 
F,wIN(" ' )~-~) ,  the verification is successful. The verification 
tolerance E(u) 2 0 for a given quality level e is obtained by 
taking into account the quantization error and the computation 
error. 
Verification proceeds as follows. If all feature codes pass 
the verification test, the image is considered authentic. To 
choose E(') so that the quality level e is acceptable, 
assuming the computation error d"), we have E(u) <: 
value of &(") corresponding to the lowest MPEG quality level 
that must be accepted by the system. 
C. Authentication of P- and B-frames 
Macrohlocks in P- and B-frames can be encoded as i)  
motion vectors and error terms, or ii) intra-coded macroblocks 
and the method will depend on the bit-rate. The linear sums 
of DCT coefficients will be used to authenticate decoded P- 
and B-frames too. However, if the same method as I-frames 
is used for all frames, then the MAC size will be large. In the 
following, we consider methods of reducing the MAC size. 
I )  Reducing the MACSize: Since P- and B-frames depends 
on I-frames, more protection needs to be provided for I-frames. 
To reduce the MAC size, we may i )  reduce the number of 
frequencies which are protected; ii) reduce the number of bits 
used for each frequency; and iii) reduce the number of blocks 
used for generation of the MAC. We will mainly consider iii) 
as i )  and ii) can always be used. 
To reduce the number of blocks we may i) skip a frame 
completely, or ii) skip part of a frame. However these result 
in unprotected frames and regions that might be exploited by 
the attacker. 
A video stream consists of a sequence of pictures. To 
produce a visible change in the video, the attacker must modify 
a number of consecutive frames. To protect a video stream 
against such attacks, it is sufficient to verify frames at a high 
enough rate such that the visible changes become detectable. 
Assuming changes to frames will be applied on consecutive 
aQt 95 (4 & I ~ I  IA;(")I + d") where Qp' is the maximum 
893 
frames for at least 60 millisccond, we may leave out some of 
the frames from the signature altogether. For example, in PAL 
and NTSC systems, there are about 30 frameskecond, and so 
each frame will be 30 milliseconds. This means that the MAC 
needs to be calculated for every other frame. 
An alternative to skipping a whole frame is to choose a 
subset of blocks in each frame such that the union of the 
subsets in consecutive frames cover the whole frame. For 
example we may choose subsets as checkerboard pattern such 
that alternate blocks are chosen in two consecutive frames. 
This method will provide good protection assuming no major 
change occur between two consecutive frames. 
D. SARI Authentication Systeni 
Lin and Chang [6] proposed an image authentication system 
known as SARI, that was later extended to video authentica- 
tion [7], [8]. SARI can be considered as a special case of the 
proposed system where m = 2 and Al(") ,Az(")  are 1,-1, 
respectively, and so CViE[,,,] IAi(")l = 2. 
IV. KEYED HASH FUNCTION 
Feature codes can be seen as hash values of a frame. 
However, if all design parameters of the system are public, 
it will be easy to construct two frames with the same feature 
code. To provide collision resistance, some key information 
must he introduced. The result will be a keyed hash function 
or a message authentication code (MAC). The key information 
will be kept secret and shared by the authentication and the 
verification systems. Parameters of the system may be used 
as the key are: i) m, the number of blocks in a group; ii) 
The composition of groups, G,("), j = 1,2 ,3 ,  ..., g; iii) S ,  
the set of protected Frequencies U; iv) Coefficients of the 
linear combination Ai("), i = 1,2 ,3 ,  ..., m; v)  The precision 
(number of bits) N(*) of the feature code for frequency U; 
and vi) The error tolerance E(u). 
The composition of groups can he specified by an incidence 
matrix, whose rows correspond to groups and columns corre- 
spond to blocks. The matrix entries are 0 and I with 1 in ( i , j )  
position showing that group i includes block j .  We assume 
groups have the same size. A larger size for a s o u p  gives 
more flexibility to the attacker to modify a target block and 
spread the compensating change over the rest of the blocks 
in the group. On the other hand larger groups mean that less 
groups are needed to cover the whole image and so shorter 
MAC will he produced. The number of blocks in a group 
must be chosen by taking these conflicting requirements into 
account. Typical values are 8, 16, and 32. 
If groups are disjoint, the change in a block will affect 
one feature code. To spread the change in a block to other 
blocks, groups must be linked. Two groups G; and Gj are 
linked if there is a sequence of groups Gi, G C + ~  ' .  .Gj such 
that Gt n Gt+l # 0, t = i, i + 1 , .  . . , j where i < j .  We 
require that groups be linked. 
I )  Linear Combination Coeficients: Let AM IN(^) and 
AMAX(")  denote the maximum and the minimum value of 
the linear combination coefficients and assume A;(") is chosen 
randomly from the interval [AMIN(”) ,  AMAX(”) ] .  A change 
a in a DCT coefficient is multiplied by Ai(”) and so will 
be magnified for high multipliers. If all regions of the image 
have the same significance, then A;(”) must be chosen equal 
or close to each other. 
2) A Proposal for MAC; We choose the secret key informa- 
tion to be the mapping between the the incidence matrix and 
the blocks in a frame. This means that the size of the key space 
is p!. The system parameters such as precision of coefficients, 
the number of groups, and the protected frequencies will be 
determined by other considerations such as the length of the 
M A C ,  and the quality level of the MPEG compression that 
must be tolerated. 
V. EVALUATION OF THE MAC 
3)  Securig: We show an estimate of the cost of construct- 
ing a fraudulent frame that passes the verification test. The 
cost of constructing a fraudulent video clip by using the best 
known attack [9] is lower bounded by this. The analysis of 
the system is using the following scenario. 
An attacker has access to a video decoder which contains 
the key in a tamperpmof device. He wants to modify a single 
frame in an authentic MPEG stream. The attacker can input 
various frame and MAC pairs and receive the response of the 
decoder: 
He will succeed if he can construct a frame and MAC pair 
that is acceptable by the decoder. He does not know the blocks 
in each group. To modify a chosen block the attacker has to 
find other blocks in the same group and modify them such 
that the change to the chosen block is compensated. If groups 
are linked, a change propagates through all groups. 
It can be shown [ 5 ]  that the cost of finding all groups is 
at most C;=, (Q - (m - ‘1‘’ - ‘1) verification operations 
m. 
/ ..I - \  
For example, if p = 4096 and m = 8 then gm = 2p because 
each block belongs to two groups and so g = 1024 and the 
cost of finding all blocks of Gj,Vj is C FZ verification 
operations. 
A similar attack can be used against the SARI system [9]. 
The costs of tinding a pair of blocks, and all pairs, are p-1 and 
pa/4, respectively. For example, if p = 4096, finding all pairs 
costs about 4 x lo6, which is much smaller than C loz6 
and so SARI is considered to be insecure. 
4 )  Eficiency of rhe MAC: The length of the MAC for one 
frame is given by L = gCuESN(”) where S is the set of 
protected frequencies. The length of the MAC is proportional 
to the number of groups. This suggests to have larger number 
of blocks per group. The number of bits allocated to the 
feature codes corresponding to Yj(”1 is determined by the 
compression level that must be tolerated. If only high quality 
images must be acceptable, then more bits must be allocated 
to the feature codes. 
5)  Implementation and Experiments: We implemented the 
systems and performed a number of experiments to verify 
our results. These experiments show that local and global 
modifications can be effectively detected for MAC sizes of 
8K per frame for a 352 x 240 color MPEC stream. However 
small modification may remain undetected if smaller MAC 
sizes are used. To examine tamper detection property of the 
system, we used a stream “table tennis” (Fig.1). The number 
“3 1.47.48” on the poster was modified to “41.47.48.” in an I- 
frame (PSNR Red: 37.0 dB, Green: 37.0 dB, Blue: 38.3 dB). 
The modification was detected by the system. 
Fig. I. 
fnme (right). 
Tamper detection experiment: The original (left) and the modified 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We proposed an MPEC tolerant video authentication system 
with adjustable security, that can be efficiently incorporated 
into the MPEG compression algorithm. The MAC consists 
of a number of feature codes that can be carefully chosen to 
protect regions of interest in the image and to various levels of 
accuracy. MAC generation and verification are very efficient 
and assuming the D C I  coefficient are available, only requires 
a small number of multiplication and addition. 
We analyzed security of the MAC in a proposed attack 
scenario and estimated the computational cost of attack under 
the best known strategy. More formal modeling and analysis 
of security remains a challenging open problem. 
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